for purposes of regulation and legislation? What is our "yardstick" against which to evaluate whether to move forward with a particular technology?
Generally speaking, there exist two frameworks for evaluating novel technologies. One, which finds support in the United States, as well as among the producers of these technologies, takes the position "innocent until proven guilty." This represents, at its most basic level, the traditional risk assessment. Risk assessment, in effect, places the onus on regulatory agencies and the general public to prove that a given technology is not safe-or requiring, in terminology that will be revisited later, that these groups falsify the statement "it's safe."
The other choice reverses the burden of proof onto those who produce these potentially harmful technologies. As described in perhaps the most recognized statement defining this position (from the 1998 Wingspread Statement), "the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof of safety" (Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999, pp. 8-9) . In doing this, the following stance is taken: "Guilty until proven innocent." This position is popularly referred to as the "precautionary principle." The precautionary principle, which shapes much of European environmental policy today, begins with the assumption that any given technology is harmful and it is up to those who have manufactured it to show otherwise-that is, it requires them to prove the statement "it's safe."
In what follows, I begin by critically opening these two frameworks up, focusing particularly on their claims of certainty, objectivity, and neutrality. In doing this, we find the precautionary principle and traditional risk assessment to be not so different after all. I thus argue that the more salient issue, beyond the risk assessment versus precautionary principle debate, centers on a more holistic approach to the handling of environmental threats.
As I argue below, the assessment and mitigation of environmental threats is a multilayered process. This process involves the democratization of the assessment process to include formal and nonformal experts alike. The problem with this, however, is that once we begin arguing for the democratization of science, what is to keep science from devolving into an epistemic free-for-all? What we need, then, is a science that, while methodologically "open" to alternative ideas and data, still rests on the cognitive authority of expertise (otherwise there could be no basis for fact and fiction other than, perhaps, through influence and power). What we need is to shift discussion to the topic of expertise.
Building off of Collins and Evans (2002) , I argue that discussions pertaining to assessing environmental threats would be best served if expertise were the focal point of discussion, versus science per se (for reasons detailed later). In doing this, we can begin to develop a pragmatic understanding of how to "open" science up to alternative ideas and data while retaining the cognitive authority of expertise. I thus present four different types of expertise that could be used to inform how threats are assessed and mitigated.
Yet focusing on the "back-end" of the production process, after a technology has been developed, is, by itself, an incomplete strategy. As Brian Wynne (2002, p. 463) argues, attention also needs to focus on the "front end" of the production process, at why there is often such widespread public dissatisfaction toward modern technologies in the first place (and out of this must also emerge discussions as to what will become of a product later in its lifecycle). A truly "open" model, then, must involve the incorporation of the aforementioned forms of expertise at every stage of production, from research, to its development and design, to assessing its threat level to humans and the environment. And it is just such a model that I work to present below.
QUESTIONING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The precautionary principle is frequently cited as having emerged in the 1970s as an articulation of the German term Vorsorgeprinzip, which translates into the "foresight," "forecaring," or "precaution" principle (although its ethos dates back to arguably the Hippocratic Oath, which states "First do no harm") (Christoforou, 2003; Goklany, 2001; Jasanoff, 2003a; Tickner, 2003a) . Since then, the precautionary principle has flourished in a variety of settings. Arguably its first international application came in 1984, at the First International Conference on Protection of the North Sea. From here, it has been integrated into numerous conventions and agreements, including, for example, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, the Barcelona Convention, the Global Climate Change Convention, and Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
One of the most cited definitions of the precautionary principle (at least within the United States) comes to us from the 1998 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof. (Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999, p. 8) 1 Although widely cited, this statement remains vague and difficult to translate into practical action (Turner & Hartzell, 2004) . For instance, what constitutes a "threat?" What about those cases where human well-being is enhanced while the health of the environment is threatened? What does "precautionary measures" mean? And who are the "proponents" that this statement refers to: those producing the technology in question, those who benefit from it, or those who may profit from it (which could include such actors as the employees of a company, the community in which the company is located, etc.)?
Arguably, the function of such an "open" definition is to ensure that "the principle" remains variable and contingent rather than "operational," which is certainly admirable given the indeterminate nature of the systems (ecological, social, etc.) that it seeks to protect. Yet in the face of such ambiguity, it then becomes left to interested parties (regulators, industry representatives, environmental advocacy organizations, and the like) to work out the operational details. What guarantee is there then that powerful actors will not shape those operational details to benefit their interests while excluding the interests of the less powerful?
Questions like this begin to highlight the importance of having relatively "open" decision-making structures so as to reduce such distortions. Yet before more can be said on this topic, we need to delve deeper into the logical underpinnings of the precautionary principle. Toward this end, allow me to break "the principle" down into two programs: an absolutist (or "strong") program and a provisional (or "weak") program. Let us turn first to an examination of what I call the "strong" program.
formulation, for example, can be seen in a statement by Jeremy Leggett (1990) former professor of earth sciences at Imperial College and scientific director of Greenpeace-when he argued that "the modus operandi we would like to see is: 'Do not emit a substance unless you have proof it will not do harm to the environment'" (p. 459, emphasis added). Thus, whereas traditional risk assessments presume technologies (chemicals, genetically modified organisms, etc.) to be safe until proven harmful, under the precautionary principle, such artifacts are presumed harmful until proven safe (Landrigen, 2002) .
The normative backdrop of the precautionary principle, particularly in this "strong" formulation, decrees that technologies should be treated as harmful until proven otherwise. In doing this, the responsibility of "proof" is placed on the shoulders of industry versus the general public and regulatory agencies. In other words, the precautionary principle requires that those to "benefit" (which is admittedly vaguely defined) from a given technology prove the statement "it's safe" if they wish to release the product onto the world.
In principle, this position is quite admirable. It holds a certain degree of moral currency by providing what many would consider a fair and just way of regulating technology: namely, those who stand to make millions from a given technology should likewise bear the burden of proof when demonstrating that such profits are not coming at the expense of humans and/or the environment. Perhaps this is why proponents of precaution often seek justification by way of ethical reasoning (e.g., Almendares, 2003; Bradshaw, 1998; Commoner, 2003) .
Ethical arguments aside, however, the underlying premise of the ("strong") precautionary principle is untenable on logical grounds. In this "strong" form, no product could ever meet the required threshold to be allowed onto the market. For specifically, how does one prove that a given technology will do no harm to either humans or the environment-that is, how does one prove the statement "it's safe?"
The ("strong") precautionary principle, at least in philosophical spirit, harkens back to days of the logical positivists (of Mach and the Vienna Circle) and their position of "verificationism." According to this position, truths are inductively acquired through repeated positive (hence the term logical positivists) verifications of a theory. Consequently, to prove that Technology X is safe is to therefore repeatedly verify the statement "Technology X is safe." And one does this by detailing, case after case, of Technology X doing no (immediate, empirically verifiable) harm. In practice this can prove highly problematic, however-for example, what does one do when human well-being is improved but the environment is threatened? Yet there is an even deeper philosophical problem with this methodological strategy, which severely undercuts the logical underpinnings of verificationism.
As Sir Karl Popper (1934 Popper ( /1961 argued, theories often take the following form: All Xs are Ys. For example, "all snow is white" or "all bodies attract one another with a force proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of their distance apart." To refute such a theoretical form thus requires that one find a single X that is not also a Y (although as Popper's critics have pointed out, cases of refutation are often not so black and white [e.g., Feyerabend, 1993; Lakatos, 1976] ). To prove such a theory, however, would require that one observe every single X to make sure that it is indeed also a Y. Yet this would mean that one must engage in an exhaustive search of not only the entire universe but of the universe from the beginning to the end of time. Logically, therefore, although refutations of theories appear to be at least possible, confirmations (as a basis for "proof") are not. Consequently, short of taking a "God's eye" position, the requirement of "proof" called for by the precautionary principle in this "strong" form is logically indefensible. Can then the precautionary principle be salvaged?
The "Weak" Program: Moving Toward Traditional Risk Assessment Some will undoubtedly take issue with my strict interpretation of "proof" as it applies to the precautionary principle to mean a "guaranteeing of no harm." They would claim, quite correctly, that nothing in this world is totally safe. Water can be lethal when too much is ingested. The same can be said for tea, coffee, apples, oxygen, sun light-indeed, anything and everything can be poisonous at high enough exposure levels. Thus, in an attempt to rescue the precautionary principle from the untenable position of verificationism, many of its proponents would claim that the goal is not the (unattainable) requirement of "proof of no harm." Rather, they would argue that the threshold is more fluid, shifting from object to object and situation to situation-perhaps as seeking "proof of being reasonably safe" (Tickner, 2003b) .
With this move, we can now drink water and tea without the fear of regulatory agencies outlawing their use. But in doing this, the precautionary principle slips into something noticeably less novel. With this move, the precautionary principle and traditional risk assessment merge into something very similar. To speak of an object being "reasonably safe" is to simply evoke the opposite side of the epistemic coin that also holds language of risk. "What is reasonably safe?" or "What represents a reasonable risk?" Ultimately, both questions seek to arrive at a similar knowledge endpoint but do so by coming from opposite epistemic directions. Although they both work from the statement "it's safe," the former seeks cases that verify it (verificationism), whereas the latter seeks cases that falsify it (falsificationism).
But I am, admittedly, getting ahead of myself. Before I can more fully discuss these points of overlap between precaution and risk, particularly in their "weaker" formulations, I must first address risk assessment in more detail.
QUESTIONING TRADITIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT
As stated at the beginning of this article, risk assessment starts with the assumption "safe until proven dangerous." How could this position be problematic? The point of contention resides in how "until proven dangerous" is defined. As we will see, establishing levels of "risk" is not as straightforward as it may initially appear. Although falsificationism may reside on firmer logical ground than verificationism, just what constitutes a case of "falsification" proves in practice to be quite problematic (Feyerabend, 1993; Lakatos, 1976) . For instance, given the ethical issues surrounding the use of human subjects, animals are often used in their stead to establish risk parameters for particular technologies (be they industrial chemicals, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, food additives, etc.). But it is questionable at best to assert that the dose response curves of, say, a particular industrial chemical will be the same for all mammalian species. Indeed, much literature seems to suggest otherwise.
For example, methylene chloride has been shown to be carcinogenic to mice and rats but not to hamsters (National Research Council, 1996) . Likewise, Carolan / THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 9 2-naphthylamine has been shown to be carcinogenic in monkeys, dogs, and hamsters, but no such effects have been reported in rats and rabbits (Proctor, 1995) . Or take Thalidomide: Although it can induce birth defects in humans at a dosage of half a milligram per kilogram of body weight per day, it has been shown to have no effect on female dogs until they are exposed to more than 100 milligrams per kilogram of body weight per day (Tesh, 2000) . Or dioxin: Although causing liver cancer in female rats at levels of 10 nanograms per kilogram of body weight per day, humans can tolerate much higher levels of exposure before it becomes harmful (Tesh, 2000) .
Even within a particular species, the charting of dose response curves have proven highly problematic. For example, a chemical may have no detectable effect on the body until a particular threshold is reached, at which point the negative effects of it on the body may increase exponentially (Krewski & Thomas, 1992) . This brings us to another poignant criticism of traditional risk assessment: that it looks at only one chemical at a time. In reality, however, we are walking around (literally) in a sea of chemicals, and thus our actual exposure is often to multiple chemicals simultaneously (Colborn, Dumanoski, & Peterson, 1997) . Consequently, although some chemicals may have no effect on the human body in isolation, this does not preclude the fact that they could be toxic at even low doses when combined with others (McKinney, 1997) .
Traditional risk assessment is also based on the assumption that the entire population of "at risk" individuals are healthy, middle-aged (often male and Caucasian) adults (Landrigen, 2002; National Research Council, 1996) . In other words, it takes a one-size-fits-all position. But we are not all the same size and shape. As such, levels of sensitivity vary across the population. A middle-age healthy male, for example, will likely not respond to a given chemical in the same way as does a 5-week old infant, whose sensitivity will likely vary from that of a 100-year-old female, and so forth.
In short, although risks assessments are often present in very clear, concise, objective, and factual terms-for example, "a concentration of 0.5 µg/kg will result in an increased cancer risk that is less than 1x10 -6 "-they are in actuality far from this "scientific" ideal. For ultimately, underneath those statements of fact are assumptions that fill in those numerous voids where uncertainties reside (remember, risk by its very nature rests on uncertainty).
The same can also be said of the precautionary principle. That is, its standard of "proof" is often contingent on the making of similar problematic assumptions as those just described in the making of risk assessments. All of which greatly places into question those "calls" that grounded such statements in fact (for example, the European Communities (Amendment) Act, 1992-Article 100a [3]-reinforced the notion that the precautionary principle should be based on "scientific facts").
The Blending of Risk Assessment and the Precautionary Principle
Arguably "strong" positions exist for both risk assessment and the precautionary principle. Since I have mentioned what this form would look like for the latter, allow me to briefly speak to what a "strong" program would look like for the former. A "strong" position for risk assessment seeks the falsification of the statement "It's safe," and where the absence of such data would suggest that the technology in question is (tentatively) safe. Risk assessment in practice, however, relies on probabilities. Therefore, in practice, risk assessments take the ("weaker") form of assessing technologies based on what is reasonably safe.
For both "weak" programs, then, the notion of "reasonability" weighs heavily in the decision-making process-particularly because certainty is a chimera for both positions, where neither verification nor falsification (as "proof") of the statement "it's safe" can occur. The "weak" position within both principles, then, draws on the values of decision makers. For without those values, decisions could not be made as to what is a reasonable risk, in the case of a risk assessment, or what is reasonably safe, in cases where the precautionary principle is evoked.
When viewed in this light, we begin to see the social underbelly of threat assessments, regardless of whether we are talking about risk assessments or the precautionary principle. When talking about issues of risk (or safety), therefore, one must always ask "risk for who?" (or "safe for whom?"). Who is creating, in the words of Ulrich Beck (1995) , these "manufactured" threats, and who are most skeptical (most untrusting) of them? Oftentimes, these are not the same individuals and/or groups. As others have noted, those in positions of power typically have resources at their disposal to minimize the effects that environmental risks pose to them (e.g., Boyce, 1994; Freudenburg, 1996 Freudenburg, , 2000 . Such inequality is what Freudenburg (2000, p. 113 ) describes when he states that environmental risks often also imply "environmental privileges." The language of risk (or precaution), then, is often also the language of inequality, where some are more vulnerable to these (often unintended) threats than others. A more inclusive interaction of all concerned partieswhich includes "fringe stakeholders" (Hart & Sharma, 2004 )-could greatly reduce some of these "environmental privileges" as technologies are developed and assessed in ways that benefit more than a privileged few.
Given that risk assessment and the precautionary principle are ultimately asking the same question (although coming at it from different epistemic directions)-namely, "it's safe," where the former seeks its falsification and the latter its verification-the more salient issue should be in how threats are assessed and mitigated. In light of the highly variable and complex nature of environmental threats, attention should be centered on developing decision-making structures that are open to all stakeholders and not just a privileged few (Berry, 2003) . Thus, when attempting to assess what is a "reasonable" threat, an answer can be arrived at that is satisfactory to all concerned parties. Toward this end, let us look more closely at the phenomenon of expertise and move toward developing a framework to guide such deliberative structures.
FOCUSING ON EXPERTISE TO ASSESS AND MITIGATE THREATS
The question of "what is science?" remains hotly contested. Indeed, as sociologists of knowledge have noted, the processes of delineating between "science" and "nonscience" is an intimately political one (Arai, 2001; Gieryn, 1983 Gieryn, , 1995 Jasanoff, 1987 Jasanoff, , 2003b . Despite attempts by some philosophers of science, we still lack normative criteria defining how science should be conducted. Perhaps the most we can say about science, then, is that it is a practice, an amalgamation of performances, technologies, and network configurations (Carolan, 2004; Pickering, 1995) . Science, in other words, is something people do, and this is different from what, say, politicians do as policy makers. Science, therefore, is not Carolan / THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 11 done by just anyone (and this is where expertise comes into the picture). Science represents those practices that experts do as experts.
Yet, when scholars and practitioners argue for the "opening" of science up to experts and nonexperts alike, they are ultimately speaking to the issue of expertise, not science. Importantly, to ignore issues of expertise in calls to democratize science is to leave oneself open to critiques of solipsism. Thus, to call for the "opening" of decision-making structures is not to suggest that anyone and everyone should be allowed to participate in science-from risk assessments to particle physics experiments. On the other hand, science should not be limited to only those who posses formal, "scientific" credentials. As I will now detail, expertise can take various forms. To open the decision-making structures up, then, when assessing environmental threats, is to retain cognitive authority but instill it within multiple forms.
In discussing expertise, I build on the work of Collins and Evans (2002) and their delineation between three types of expertise. From this seminal piece come the following three forms of expertise: no expertise, interactional expertise, and contributory expertise. In developing this distinction, Collins and Evans work from their experiences as sociologists of knowledge, and the problems they confronted in trying to grasp the esoteric subject matter they were studying. However, given that these three types of expertise were not written for the environmental sciences, some redefinitions are in order. In doing this, I have come up with the following (see also Carolan 2006a Carolan , 2006b ):
• No expertise: A degree of expertise insufficient to engage in an even cursory discussion of the topic in question.
• Contributory expertise: Enough expertise to contribute to the knowledge base of the topic in question, noting, importantly, that such cognitive authority can come in the form of either abstract/generalizable or local/practical knowledge.
• Interactional expertise: A form of expertise that rests on having contributory expertise in the form of either abstract/generalizable or local/practical knowledge while also having enough expertise to interact interestingly with those who possess contributory expertise of the other form (thus allowing for important interactions to occur between the two).
Through this typology, we can begin to move beyond monolithic understandings of expertise. Traditional understandings of expertise have tended to focus solely on the contributory expertise of abstract/generalizable knowledge, while importantly ignoring the contributory expertise of local/practical knowledge. As others have pointed out, however, by way of such terms as lay expertise (Wynne, 1996) , community science (Carr, 2004) , local knowledge (Fischer, 2000) , and popular epidemiology (Brown, 1992) , expertise-or, more specifically, contributory expertise-need not lie in the hands of formally trained scientists alone. Yet this research also highlights how contributory expertise by itself is often not enough to effectively deal with many of today's environmental threats. The uptake of local/practical knowledge is most effective when that knowledge is conveyed by individuals who are able to translate it into the technical language spoken by formally trained scientists (Carr, 2004; Epstein, 1996; Forsyth, 2004; Livesey, 2003) . And this brings us to the importance of interactional expertise: so that contributory experts of different knowledge orientations (that of both abstract/generalizable and local/practical) do not talk past each other.
With this move, we can begin to speak of "opening" decision-making structures up beyond traditional expertise while saving the position of cognitive authority.
Such an organizational form would thus include not only those contributory experts with abstract/generalizable knowledge. Also included within this process would be those contributory experts with local/practical knowledge. And to ensure the inclusion of, and interaction between, both forms of knowledge, interactional expertise must play an important role.
There remains yet a fourth type of expertise that is particularly salient in the assessment of environmental threats: "public expertise," to speak to the explicit incorporation of values into the decision-making process (Carolan, 2006a) . Public expertise is, roughly speaking, an expertise of public values, sentiments, and beliefs. Such expertise could be included in the decision-making process by way of a number of routes. For instance, the decision-making process could be opened to allow all concerned stakeholders the ability to voice their views about the environmental threat being deliberated on. Another option is to bestow this expertise on a proxy who is directly accountable to the public-such as an elected official (versus an unaccountable bureaucrat or scientist). Still another option could be something such as the consensus conference model, which has been used in such countries as Denmark, England, Australia, and Sweden to significant effect (Oughton & Strand, 2004) .
Public expertise could also play an important role before a technology is produced. By consulting with a broad array of stakeholders-both primary and fringe (Hart & Sharma, 2004 )-firms would be more likely to produce technologies that are both wanted and needed and thus less likely to be rejected. As Freudenburg (1993) notes, too often threat assessment research (e.g., risk assessment) asks "what about people leads them to reject certain technological developments, not what about industry leads it to develop technologies people reject" (p. 399). Perhaps by placing greater attention to the needs and wishes of all stakeholders, by including public expertise in business strategies, industry can develop technologies that do not immediately invite suspicion among the general public.
"Closed" Versus "Open" Models for Assessing Threats
Traditional threat/risk assessment takes the form as described in Figure 1 . Professional scientists-such as epidemiologists, statisticians, microbiologists, and the like-proceed along each of the four steps of risk assessment (problem identification, exposure assessment, toxicity assessment, and risk characterization). After which, the risk scientists then present their findings to a regulatory or legislative body. The expertise relied on, then, within this scenario, comes primarily from professional scientists. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , with the solid line connecting "contributory expertise" (limited to abstract/generalized knowledge) to "threat assessment." Admittedly, the argument could be made that when, for example, Congressional hearings are held (and public testimony is allowed), or when politicians are involved in threat assessments, public expertise is also, to a degree at least, included in the decision-making process (signified in Figure 1 by the dotted line). Traditionally, however, such input has been minimal (Jasanoff, 2003b (Jasanoff, , 2003c .
Against this, I suggest the following more "open" alternative to assessing environmental threats. As illustrated in Figure 2 , this alternative, like traditional threat assessments, involves contributory expertise. But beyond the use of contributory experts with abstract/generalized knowledge are those with local/practical knowledge-such as those engaged in the practice of popular epidemiology (Brown, 1992; Brown & Mikkelsen, 1990) . And so as to ensure that those with abstract/generalized knowledge are communicating effectively with those with Carolan / THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 13 local/practical knowledge (and visa versa), interactional expertise must likewise be included.
Importantly, however, as Collins and Evans (2002) point out, the issue of who is responsible for developing interactional expertise is not systematical. It is not, in other words, an arbitrary matter if nonscientists absorbed the knowledge of the scientists or the scientists absorbed the knowledge of the nonscientists. Clearly, for knowledge to be included in any formal threat assessment, the professional scientists must be the ones that do the absorbing. This highlights, according to Collins and Evans, where the location of change needs to be: namely, within the structures of authority. Thus, although research has illustrated that it has often been citizens (and not professional scientists) who have had to develop interactional expertise to have their voices and accompanying data heard by the larger scientific community (e.g., Carr, 2004; Epstein, 1996; Forsyth, 2004; Lachmund, 2004) , this responsibility lies with scientists. For not only are professional scientists more likely to have access to resources to initiate and nurture this dialogue between themselves and contributory experts with local/practical knowledge, but ultimately, taking such steps would likewise do much to reduce conflict and build trust among stakeholders (Fiorino, 1990 ).
Yet, as discussed in an earlier section, threat assessments cannot be conducted with purely contributory and interactional expertise alone. Ultimately, numerous assumptions have to be made along the way to determine what a "reasonable" threat is. As such, the threat assessment becomes a very value-laden activity, which brings us to the importance of public expertise.
Of course, just how this public expertise will manifest itself depends, in part, on the model of democracy one is working from. If working from the premise of a "direct democracy," where all assemble to voice their views and dictate policy, then perhaps public expertise will have to take a more direct form-such as a consensus conference or polling the citizenry to find out the views of the majority. On the other hand, if working from the ideals of a "representative democracy," then public expertise might take the form of a publicly elected official (Anex & Focht, 2002) .
Ideally, any incorporation of public expertise into the decision-making process would be an iterative process. For instance, although formalized techniques to determine citizens' values are readily available (e.g., "citizens' values assessment" [Stolp, Groen, Van Vliet, & Vanclay, 2002] ), such techniques allow for very little participatory engagement. That is, although they provide a gauge for public sentiment, they fail to problematize the issue itself, such as how it is framed-for example, "Are the right questions being asked?" "Is the problem being framed correctly?" and so forth. Additionally, these techniques do little to engage the public in the actual assessment of risk and environmental impacts and the weighing of costs and benefits (Petts, 2003 (Petts, , 2004 .
Building and Maintaining Trust
This brings us to the issue of trust. As mentioned, risk assessment is a social and political act. Wilson and Crouch (1982) , for example, document that the manner of how individuals measure risk can increase or decrease the level of risk documented. Specifically, they illustrate that between 1950 and 1970 coal mines could be shown to have become either more or less risky depending on the measure used: That is, when measured in terms of "deaths from accidents per ton of coal," risks decreased, yet when measured in terms of "deaths from accidents per employee," risks marginally increased. Along these lines, Slovic (1987 Slovic ( , 1996 Slovic ( , 1999 has illustrated how both the public and scientists (particularly when working beyond their realm of expertise) alike are influenced by emotions, worldviews, ideologies, and values. Other research has pointed to gender differences in relation to risk judgments and attitudes (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994) . Similar results were likewise shown to hold among scientists (Barke, Jenkins-Smith, & Slovic, 1997) . Slovic, Malmfors, Mertz, Neil, and Purchase (1997) , for instance, found that female members of the British Toxicological Society were more likely than their male counterparts to judge risks as either "moderate" or "high."
In light of the conflation of facts, values, beliefs, and worldviews in threat assessments, trust plays an important role in shaping how stakeholders assess risk (Carolan, 2006c; Freudenburg, 1993; Slovic, 1999; Wynne, 1992 Wynne, , 1996 . In other words, the trustworthiness of an institutional configuration, in part, shapes whether the risk statements to emerge from it are deemed to be truthful by all stakeholders (Carolan & Bell, 2003 . Incorporating into the decisionmaking structure the abovementioned forms of expertise would help significantly to reduce conflict and build trust between industries, regulatory agencies, and the public as individuals from each of those realms are drawn on for their "expertise" (see, e.g., Wokutch, 2001 ).
Yet the nurturing of trust often only occurs at the "back-end" of the production process, after the technology has been developed and a risk assessment is forthcoming. As Brian Wynne (2002) argues, attempts to improve public participation in risk assessments, although admirable, have served to "perversely reinforce attention on only back-end science questions about consequences or risks" (p. 463) instead of looking at why such widespread public dissatisfaction exists toward modern technologies. A truly "open" model, then, would involve the Carolan / THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 15 incorporation of the above types of expertise at every stage of production, from research to development to assessing threats. Thus, rather than solely focusing on the back-end of the production process, after a technology has been developed and risk assessments are being conducted, similar energies need to be placed at the front end of the process, before a technology has been mass produced.
For example, some scholars argue that Monsanto is experiencing such pervasive global distrust in its "brand" and products, in part because it has failed miserably to reach out to "fringe" stakeholders and develop a business model that meets their needs (Hart & Sharma, 2004) . Thus, rather than focusing almost exclusively on increasing the productivity of industrial-scale corn, soybeans, and the like, perceptions of trustworthiness toward Monsanto would be greatly improved were they to place more emphasis on product development of crops that are meaningful to small farmers in the developing world (e.g., cassava, sweet potatoes). By including the above types of expertise (contributory, interaction, and public) into its research and development phases, Monsanto would do much to help reduce the risks many perceive regarding the technologies that it produces. Indeed, were such a model adopted in the past, Monsanto would likely not have developed technologies that illustrate such "arrogance" (to quote Monsanto's CEO Robert Shapiro in the wake of this controversy [Hart & Sharma, 2004, p. 7] ) as that found in the creation of a "terminator gene."
Scholars have repeatedly highlighted the tie between risk and impressions of "vulnerability" (Beamish, 2001; Erikson, 1995; Freudenburg, 1993; Leiss, 1995) . Others, such Beck, Giddens, and Lash (e.g., Beck, 1986 Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Giddens, 1990) , speak more directly to the erosion of trust in institutions and experts (also called "expert systems") because of the complex character of today's technologies, the effects of which cannot be fully understood except in the laboratory of the real world-what is popularly called the "risk society" thesis. And although disputing the claim that high modernity is profoundly different from earlier times in terms of a heightened eroding of trust in experts systems, Wynne (1992 Wynne ( , 1996 notes how dependency on those systems can lead to a collective distrusting of them as people are unable to participate in them.
In short, a significant amount of research has highlighted the relationship between trust, participation, and risk. Thus, although it may be unrealistic to expect any technology to be totally safe-for, as discussed earlier, nothing in this world could meet such strict criterion-it is not unrealistic to expect those technologies to be developed and assessed in ways that involve a greater array of stakeholders. As noted by Steve Rayner and Robin Cantor (1987) , the question driving debates surrounding what is an "acceptable" risk should not be "How safe is safe enough?" but "How fair is safe enough?" This can only be answered with the aid of all types of expertise-contributory, interactional, and public. In doing this, risks may not be completely eliminated, but they can be reduced to "reasonable" levels, as defined by all stakeholders.
IMPROVING DESIGN/REDUCING THREATS
Although much has been written as to the socially constructed nature of risks (Douglas & Wildavshy, 1982; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Rayner, 1987 Rayner, , 1990 Rayner, , 1992 Slovic, 1987; Stallings, 1995) , we must not forget their material underbelly, which is to say that risks often involve reference to real entities-such as dioxin, radiation, endocrine disruptors, driving without a seatbelt, sky diving, and so forth (Carolan, 2006c; Rosa, 1998) . To speak of risks, and of environmental risks in particular, is thus to also refer to issues related to management, production, and design. Thus far, I have spoken to the social side of risks and threats: namely, by focusing on how risks are perceived and how best to coordinate organizational structures to reduce perceptions of them. In this section, I would like to turn attention to the material side of risks, by recognizing that they are also, at least in part, inefficiencies of the production process. Attempts to reduce environmental threats must likewise therefore include improvements in design.
Unfortunately, the issue of eco-design has been scantly addressed by social scientists (particularly sociologists), save for perhaps those in the field of industrial ecology (e.g., Ryan, 2003 Ryan, , 2004 Sakai et al., 2003; Van Der Voet, Van Oers, & Nikolic, 2004) . This is surprising given the growing interest, particularly in the European Union and within such international agencies as the United National Environmental Program, to encourage companies to incorporate eco-design into product development (Castell, Clift, & France, 2004; Ryan, 2003) . As such, ecodesign has been an important component of sustainable development in recent years, which can be seen in the extensive portfolio of commercially successful eco-products produced by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2001) .
One example of this involves what is called "extended producer responsibility" (EPR) (Tong, Lifset, & Lindhqvist, 2004) . Traditionally, manufacturers have only been responsible for immediate pollution emissions, whereas municipal governments are responsible for reuse, recycling, and disposal of wastes. Moreover, because manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and retail sale have remained economically isolated from reuse, recycling, and disposal, products and packaging have not been designed for minimizing waste and ease of disassembly and recycling. EPR is thus a policy strategy designed to shift "downstream" costs of disassembly, recycling, and/or disposal onto the "upstream" producer. In doing this, there thus becomes a strong economic incentive for companies to design products in ways to maximize recyclebility and reusability.
For an example of such a practice in action, we can look toward Dow Chemical's "rent-a-chemical" scheme. Chlorinated solvents are used in many industrial products-from cleaning agents to adhesives to solvents. Unfortunately, however, few of these chemicals are captured and recycled, meaning that the majority evaporate and contribute to air and groundwater pollution (McDaniel et al., 2004) . As a result, there has been a stepping up of legal measures to make chemical manufacturers more responsible for what happens to their products after they are sold. In response, Dow Chemical (specifically, its Germany branch), through a joint venture with a recycling company, now keeps control over hazardous chemicals throughout their life cycles, as well as simultaneously increasing productivity in solvent use and production-what they call "SafeChem" (http://www.dow.com/safechem/index.htm). Taking control of how the chemicals are used and handled enables the clients to reuse and recycle them, with testing equipment provided to maintain the quality of the product at every stage. This scheme has seen such success that Dow has recently taken the step of effectively "renting" the chemicals to their customers, which creates yet further economic incentive for Dow to capture, recycle, and reuse its chemicals to the maximum extent possible (see also Alastair, 2002; Hawken, Lovins, & Lovins, 1999; McDonough & Braungart, 2002; Otto, 2001 ). This example is informative for the discussion at hand, for it highlights how threat mitigation must also involve proper eco-design and management (Ammenberg & Sundin, 2005; Maxwell & van der Vorst, 2003; Shrivastava, 1995) . Granted, risks will always surround the use chemicals. Nevertheless, the "cradle to cradle" (McDonough & Braungart, 2002 ) scheme adopted by Dow in the case of "SafeChem," although not perfect, represents a step in the right direction for reducing the release of manufactured risks into the environment. Further steps toward eco-design improvement could thus include moving beyond the use of toxic chemicals through the design and production of solvents and plastics that are completely biodegradable (see, e.g., Miertus & Ren, 2002; Stevens, 2002) . In doing this, some suggest products could be made that are not only "reasonably" safe but that are made of materials that could actually, for example, nourish the soils as they break down (McDonough & Braungart, 2002; McDonough, Braungart, Anastas, & Zimmerman, 2003; Segars, Bradfield, Wright, & Realff, 2003) .
CONCLUSION
I began this article demonstrating that risk assessment and the precautionary principle, while coming from different epistemological directions, are fundamentally asking the same question: for risk assessment, the question is "What is a reasonable risk?" whereas for the precautionary principle, it is "What is reasonably safe?" I then proceeded to suggest an alternative position to assessing and mitigating threats, which is more holistic in its orientation (versus the limited scope of both traditional risk assessment and the precautionary principle, given their focus on the "back end" of the production process). This position is visually depicted in Figure 3 .
As I argue, the assessment and mitigation of environmental threats is a multilayered process. This involves the "opening" of the assessment process up to formal and nonformal experts alike, through the use of contributory, interactional, and public expertise. Granted, consultation provisions are currently built into many regulatory processes (e.g., Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency). As is often the case, however, such forms of "consultation" are skewed toward lobbyists and other economically related interests. Thus, although the decision-making process is arguably already "open," the question is "who are they open to?" Attention must therefore be directed toward institutionalizing the above-mentioned types of expertise, so that access to these structures moves from being power based to knowledge (or expert) based.
Yet focusing on the "back end" of the production process, after a technology has been developed, is, by itself, an incomplete strategy. As argued, attention also needs to focus on the "front end" of the production process. A truly "open" model, then, would involve the incorporation of the aforementioned forms of expertise at every stage of production, from the "front" to the "back" end.
We cannot stop there, however. Attention must also focus on the material side of production itself-at what is being produced and what is being released into the environment through this process (by way of production inefficiencies). Environmental risks/threats have both a material and social correlate. The delineation between what is and is not an environmental risk or threat is a thoroughly social and political process (Rayner, 1990) . Yet, at the same time, those assessments are often in reference to something that is real (and that can really do harm to us), such as DDT, radon, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, and the like (Murphy, 2002) . Thus, any attempt to mitigate risks must also include a rethinking about how technologies are both designed and produced.
Through this, we can move beyond the debate between risk assessment and the precautionary principle and enter into a more fruitful discussion regarding how best to manage the entire life cycle of a given product. This includes thinking not only about the "front" and "back" end of the production process. It also must involve planning for the end of a product's life, which, if planned with an eye toward eco-design, would mark only its beginning. -25, 1998) . At the conclusion of this 3-day event, the group of 32 conference participants (which included treaty negotiators, activists, scholars, and scientists from the United States, Canada, and Europe) issued a statement calling for government, corporations, communities, and scientists to implement the "precautionary principle," as defined earlier, in making decisions.
2. When, for example, does dogmatism cease and falsificationism begin (Feyerabend, 1993; Lakatos, 1976) ? For instance, many "anomalies" still exist under Einstein's general theory of relativity. Yet these "anomalies" do not falsify it. So the question then becomes (which has yet to be adequately answered by philosophers of science), at what point would such anomalies falsify Einstein's theory?
